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CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: IS 
TAKING RITES SERIOUSLY A 
FANTASY, FOLLY, OR FAILURE? 
Steven D. Pepe* 
Now that clinical legal education programs are midway into 
their second decade of development, a number of forces call into 
question the future of this experiment. A changed social context, 
. declining law school enrollments, and general economic con-
straints on universities may again prove that "[i]nnovation in le-
gal education comes hard, is limited in scope and permission, 
and generally dies young."1 
Clinical programs were the outgrowth of several forces in the 
sixties. The war in Vietnam, racial explosions in the ghettos, and 
the growing visibility of unjustified economic, social, and sexual 
inequality caused a stirring from which law schools were not ex-
empt. Law students began questioning the relevance of their 
courses that aimed primarily toward the service of the existing 
social and economic order and ignored the most pressing 
problems of the day. Many students wanted legal careers more 
directly linked to their values and idealism. 
A ten million dollar grant from the Ford Foundation to the 
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility pro-
vided the economic base that, when merged with the student 
discontent in law schools, would make possible the initial devel-
opment of clinic programs. While limited follow-up funding 
from the Department of Education continues, clinics today are 
more dependent for their continuance on private foundation 
grants and law school budgets. Many faculties, concerned with 
shrinking law school budgets and growing gaps between the sal-
ary levels of practitioners and law professors, are asking whether 
the unsubsidized costs of clinical programs are worth the bene-
fits clinics provide. This questioning occurs at a time when 
clinical programs have demonstrated their educational worth to 
the satisfaction of most law school faculties. Fieldwork clinics' 
• Magistrate, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and 
Adjunct Lecturer, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., 1965, University of Notre 
Drune; J.D., 1968, University of Michigan; LL.M., 1972, Harvard University. 
1. R. REDMOUNT & T. SHAFFER, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 21, 24 (1977). 
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growth period has ended. Now that clinicians and others have 
developed respectable simulation teaching methods, simulation 
courses prove more attractive to satisfy the pressures for more 
practical offerings than the more expensive fieldwork clinical 
models. 
A glut of law graduates in a leveling legal market creates stu-
dent concern about finding an entry level job. Student enthusi-
asm for legal services for society's disadvantaged has faded. 
Some students worry. that experience in a clinical course in a 
legal services setting raises suspicions in large firms about their 
priorities and career interests. Students also consider that 
clinical programs, even absent any "poverty law taint," are less 
marketable in resumes and their accompanying transcript~ than 
safer traditional law school offerings. When these factors are 
combined with the voting strength of clinicians and their allies 
on most faculties, the future of clinical fieldwork courses appears 
problematic. 
This article assesses the primary product of law schools-the 
practicing lawyer-and reviews the criticisms of the adequacy of 
the initial training for attorneys that law schools provide. After 
a brief. review of goals of legal education and goals of clinical 
teaching methods, the article argues that properly structured 
clinical programs are not based on flawed premises and that the 
nation's law schools, particularly the leading schools, should not 
abandon their clinical experiments without further efforts to 
help clinical legal education achieve its unfulfilled promises. The 
premises and assertions of this article are not new. Indeed, they 
are reiterations of a controversy that has been ongoing, with var-
ying degrees of intensity, for over a half century. 
I. THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER 
Nearly ninety percent of the graduates of Michigan Law 
School practice law in some form. A total of less than five per-
cent enter either teaching, the legislative, or executive branches 
of goverments. 2 An analysis of the various elements that define 
an attorney highlights those elements of a lawyer's skills to 
which law schools can make their most effective contributions. A 
2. Adams & Chambers, The Recent Alumni of the University of Michigan Law 
School: A Report on a Survey of the Classes of 1966 and 1967 Fifteen Years After Gradu-
ation and the Classes of 1976 and 1977 Five Years After Graduation 26 (1984) (on file 
with u. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
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simplified scheme can serve as a heuristic model. The scheme 
conceives of a lawyer as a series of overlapping collections of ex-
perience, knowledge, and beliefs that could be grouped in the 
following categories of legal doctrine, institutional understand-
ing, skills, professional role, and personal identity. 
A. Legal Doctrine 
Lawyers differ from other individuals because of their special-
ized knowledge of substantive and procedural rules, including 
both the specific rules and the general policies, norms, and 
processes that compose our legal universe. The ideas in this col-
lection of specialized knowledge provide the primary focal points 
of legal educators and bar examiners. 
B. Institutional Understanding 
Legal doctrine is institutionally based. Attorneys cannot use-
fully apply legal doctrine for clients without acquiring a vast 
knowledge about the interpersonal and institutional elements of 
the settings in which their clients operate. This knowledge com-
monly affects outcomes more than does legal doctrine. Lawyers 
learn about the structure, reward system, access and leverage 
points of courts, probation departments, law enforcement agen-
cies, social service departments, corporations, insurance compa-
nies, trade or labor unions, legislatures, and law firms. Effective 
service to clients requires coping, persuading, bargaining, 
manipulating, or avoiding maneuvers in various institutional 
transactions. Commonly, legal doctrines affect modes of persua-
sion, bargaining, and the relative power of the parties. Other fac-
tors such as personality, bias, status, power, money, and a cer-
tain degree of fortune also affect outcome. In such transactions, 
legal doctrine may have little relevance if other dynamics are 
mishandled. 
The legal realists noted that the law could not be understood 
apart from these institutional and interpersonal elements. Such 
an understanding gives legal doctrine a more humble, but more 
accurate, meaning. Law schools have begun to focus more atten-
tion on this interplay of legal theory and institutions. Yet, cogni-
tive classroom studies can teach only a limited amount about 
these extralegal factors. A fuller comprehension of such elements 
and their interactions develops only in the world of experience 
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and practice. 
C. Skills 
Many discussions about clinical legal education suggest that 
traditional law school pedagogy is theoretical and that clinical 
programs develop practical skills. The truth is that law schools 
have always focused on skills training. The skills, however, are 
the skills of legal analysis, analogic thinking, and persuasive ar-
gument. Such skills are central to legal practice, but their useful-
ness to law professors does not make them any the less skills. 
No one argues that training in these traditional law school skills 
is inappropriate for law school education merely because they 
are also practice skills. Nor is there the assumption that they are 
skills that cannot be taught. While the vehicle used to teach 
these skills-legal doctrine-is theoretical, the pedagogical 
method of teaching them is not theoretical. Rather, like many 
skills, they are taught by teacher modeling and student drill 
within the classroom dialogue. The legal academy deems this 
skills training one of its greatest achievements, teaching novi-
tiates how to think like lawyers. 
Other skills are necessary for novitiates to think and act like 
lawyers. These include the skills involved in interviewing, coun-
seling, decision making, problem solving, case planning, advo-
cacy, and bargaining. While the methods used to teach these 
skills may differ, and law faculty members may have lesser incli-
nation, talent, or experience to train in these skills, the skills are 
no less amenable to modeling and drill than the legal analysis 
exercises that occur in law schools. Nor are these skills any less 
appropriate for law school training than legal reasoning skills. 
Each of them is subject to thoughtful analysis about theories of 
effectiveness and, like legal reasoning and argument, each of 
these skills has a cognitive element and a· performance element 
capable of being evaluated and improved. 
D. Professional Role 
In addition to the doctrinal base, institutional understanding, 
and practice skills, lawyers assume a professional role comprised 
of behavioral and dispositional expectancies. Professional codes 
of conduct define many of these expectancies through minimum 
requirements for competency, diligence, and concern for client, 
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accompanied by limits on exploitation of client and opponent, 
adversarial conduct, business activities, and misuse of office. In 
addition, lawyers are socialized in the informal rules, customs, 
and procedures of the tribunals and agencies before which they 
practice. The professional role creates performance demands as 
well as a set of permissions and privileges that facilitate lawyers' 
work. All these factors define the lawyer's public self. 
E. Personal Identity 
There is another part of all attorneys-the private self-those 
meanings and values that define the person. The private self 
chooses relationships and degrees of responsibility to others and 
society. From one's identity flow philosophical and political be-
liefs, the capacities for creativity and aesthetic appreciation, re-
ligious sentiments, love, and trust relations. As one of my stu-
dents cynically stated, "This is the part of yourself that you 
leave on the doorstep as you enter law school and hope it's still 
there three years later when you leave." 
Although law school does not focus on this, the relation be-
tween the professional and personal identity defines each law-
yer's future. Some lawyers attempt to separate their professional 
role and their personal identity. During the day these lawyers 
act as "hired guns," remaining neutral to clients' motives and 
ends. They use their professional role as a justification to dis-
tance themselves from any accountability for the consequences 
of their actions or the unfairness of the ends they may serve. 
After five o'clock, these lawyers can again become humanists, 
concerned about others and society. This relationship of per-
sonal identity and professional role may lead to a schizophrenia 
and self-delusion ri~ky to both the lawyer's personal and profes-
sional existence. 
Another resolution, visible in the 1960's and early 1970's, al-
lows the personal portion of the self to dominate and demean 
the professional role. One's personal or political goals are served 
through manipulation of the professional role, undercutting all 
limits imposed by professional codes of conduct. Instrumental 
manipulation of the rules, deception, and coercion are limited 
only to the extent that such tactics would not be effective. 
In the most frequent resolution, the professional role domi-
nates the personal identity. Most lawyers occasionally allow role 
appropriate behavior to surface in inappropriate settings; a mod-
est example is the attorney whose dinner conversations with a 
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non-lawyer spouse are governed by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Adversarial behavior sometimes occurs in personal rela-
tions when listening, caring, and supporting would be more ap-
propriate responses. For some lawyers, occasional becomes 
habitual; adversarial, analytic, non-emotive responses erode 
other personal capacities. In the extreme case, this role en-
croachment is so complete that "being a lawyer" defines one's 
total self. 
Obviously, a healthy resolution of one's professional role and 
personal identity enables personal meanings and values to find 
expression in professional work. An integrated and autonomous 
person maintains the capacity, disposition, and sensitivity to re-
spond appropriately when acting in or out of a professional role. 
While professional tasks serve personal values, personal motives 
do not sabotage role obligations. For a well-integrated person, 
the learning, choices, and actions of professional tasks are con-
gruent with furtherance of the personal dimensions. 
II. THE CRITIQUES OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
The case method has been the predominant mode of legal ed-
ucation since Langdell introduced it at Harvard in 1870. 
Through case analysis students are introduced to the basic doc-
trines of the law and the modes of analysis and fact analogy that 
are essential to legal thought. Students study legal reasoning 
and policy analysis in the broader context of the Socratic dia-
logue on a case. The case method was seen as an escape from 
legal formalism, a way to teach "the living law" instead of ab-
stract legal theories. 8 Over sixty years ago, however, Alfred Reed 
criticized the case method, especially in the second and third 
years of law school.' He focused on· overreliance on the case 
3. Roscoe Pound, whose training was in science, not law, noted in 1903: "As teachers 
of science were slow to put the microscope and the scalpel into the hands of students and 
permit them to study nature, not books, so have we been fearful of putting reports into 
[law students'] hands, and permitting them to study the living law." J. REDLICH, THE 
COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 41 (1914), 
quoted in R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 
1980s 119 (1983). It is ironic that the bar was inclined to more overarching theories of 
formalistic jurisprudence, and considered the case method "a mass of . . . 'practical' rub-
bish." The case method was too disconnected and detached to show the continuous and 
steady fl.ow of the law and its more unitary concepts. Report of Committee on Legal 
Education, 15 A.BA PROC. 350, 368 (1892), quoted in R. STEVENS, supra, at 59. 
4. A REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF LAW 285, 369-88 (1921), cited in 
Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 703 n.10. 
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method, flaws in the content covered, pedagogic inefficiency, and 
the failure of law schools to provide adequate practical instruc-
tion to enable graduates to perform basic lawyering tasks 
competently. 
Many of today's criticisms of legal education sound strikingly 
similar to Reed's. They can be divided into four areas: (a) a pro-
fessional critique of the content and scope of legal education; 
(b) a pedagogical critique of the methodology and its structural 
and psychological deficiencies; (c) an academic critique of the 
sufficiency of the law's intellectual basis for university study; 
and (d) a sociological/political critique of legal education's fail-
ure to prepare graduates adequately for service to society. 
A. The Professional Critique 
1. Case method content- Even before the Reed Report, the 
bar criticized law schools' predominant fascination with analysis 
of appellate cases. The case method was accused of inadequately 
teaching the statutory and administrative law commonly used 
by lawyers. Critics also noted that many important legal and so-
cial issues do not find their way into appellate cases. 
2. Case method distortions- Critics also charge that the 
case method provides an unrealistic view of legal disputes and 
distorts students' understanding of how the law operates in soci-
ety. The law school's simplistic model of rule analysis and appli-
cation does not consider the essential ingredients in interper-
sonal and institutional complexities that give the law its 
ultimate meaning. The case method takes the facts as given by 
some appellate court or as varied by a law professor. Such facts 
are artificial; they have been filtered by the judge, lawyers, and 
parties. In reality, the incompleteness, tentativeness, ambiguity, 
and conflict regarding facts, coupled with their malleability by 
the biases of parties, witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors, make 
the application of legal doctrine far different than the Socratic 
dialogue would suggest. The case method focuses more on legal 
issues than on the actors and institutions involved. Such an ab-
stract approach is not the "living law." The case method fails to 
train students to think like lawyers because its analysis is in-
complete. Although the classroom discussion may appropriately 
screen out the multiple complicating factors to initiate analysis 
of an "ideal type" of legal problem, it does not later add the rich 
context, the partial information, and the attempts to manipulate 
that exist in the institutional settings in which legal doctrines 
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find their real meaning.11 
The professor may acknowledge the existence of these con-
taminating factors but discounts them as not being worthy of 
intellectual attention and analysis. When law professors-the 
major role models in law students' initial professional socializa-
tion-focus on abstract ideas and legal issues to the exclusion of 
the people involved, they convey an unstated message that the 
legal issues, not the clients and their problems, are of greatest 
importance. A second message exists, that there is a hierarchy of 
interesting problems that great minds find worthy of analysis. 
Many law graduates consider a matter worthy of their interest 
only if it contains complicated legal issues. Yet most legal 
problems, whether a securities registration or a divorce, do not 
involve complicated legal issues. Many practitioners tend to dis-
count their work and to be discounted by other lawyers if they 
are not working on complex or cutting-edge legal issues. If the 
non-doctrinal issues of practicing law are given thoughtful atten-
tion, they are as interesting and complex as the substantive law. 
Most clients and legal problems are of enormous complexity and 
interest if the personal, skills, and institutional dimensions of 
the case are thoroughly considered. Law schools miss an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate areas of importance and interest that ac-
company even the most commonplace legal matter. A truly hu-
manistic legal education would infuse legal problems with a 
serious analysis of the formidable personal and psychological el-
ements of the participants, including the lawyers. This would 
engage the students in the emotional depths of a case. If legal 
theory and humanistic perspectives are taught without being 
rooted in and reinforced by the problems of practice, students 
may more easily discount or forget law school lessons on the 
connection of theory to personal performance and institutional 
dimensions once they commence their professional careers. 6 
5. Frank compared the Langdell case method to a trip to a city in which the ultimate 
destination was omitted from the ticket. J. FRANK, CouRTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY 
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 231 (1949). 
6. Dean Terrance Sandalow notes the necessary relation of law, emotion, and a recog-
nition of life's complexity: 
A failure to devote class time to probing beneath the abstract language that judi-
cial opinions typically-and statutes invariably-employ conveys to students the 
lesson that emotion and the complexities of life are irrelevant to law. And by 
leading students during a formative intellectual period to think only in abstract 
categories, legal education can dull both feeling and their sensitivity to complex-
ity .... The appropriate objective is not the release of feeling, but its educa-
tion. This requires ... bringing feeling into contact with the full range of life's 
possibilities, but it also requires [that] it be brought into contact with those gen-
eral ideas we call knowledge. 
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The case method obscures what is important in legal practice. 
Law professors teach students not how to be practitioners but 
how to be law review editors, appellate court clerks, law firm 
memo writers and, if they are lucky, law professors. These les-
sons, of great importance for all lawyers, are nevertheless incom-
plete. Such lessons must be demythologized by contact with the 
world of practice where many cases involve only interesting peo-
ple and not interesting issues, and where economic realities or 
institutional tolerance will not permit the full briefing and argu-
ment that law school learning anticipates. 
Another criticism of the focus on appellate disputes suggests 
that it socializes lawyers into greater reliance on the adversarial 
mode, making the profession more litigious and confrontational 
and less amenable to cooperative modes of private ordering and 
regulation. 7 
3. Curricular scope and method- Critics assert that the law 
school curriculum focuses too much attention on doctrine. The 
areas of substantive law have mushroomed, precluding the possi-
bility of teaching the corpus juris in law school. Whether be-
cause of the pressures of the bar exam or because of the desire 
to maintain legal education as the cheapest form of graduate ed-
ucation and to assure a market for the wares the faculty has to 
offer, legal doctrine dominates the legal curriculum. Law schools 
have diversified their offerings in recent years, but usually with-
out dropping courses from the range of the legal subjects taught. 
With statutes outdistancing case law in doctrinal expansion, the 
case method has yielded to the problem method for teaching 
Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 163, 172 (1984). 
Sandalow suggests that this can adequately be done in the classroom: "A skillful teacher 
will lead students to read opinions imaginatively, with attention to the human possibili-
ties that lie beneath their abstract language. The exploration of these possibilities, con-
joined with consideration of their implications for judgment, offers opportunity for de-
veloping that fusion of feeling and intellect we call sensibility." Id. Sandalow does not 
address the issue of whether the law professor, with no academic training or little or no 
practice experience in these areas, is capable of developing adequate conceptual models 
for abstract discussion of these subjects. 
7. As Langdell assumed the deanship at Harvard, the leaders of the bar believed that 
law school should prepare graduates for corporate practice and feared the case method's 
preoccupation on litigated cases would encourage attorneys to sue rather than restrain 
their clients' urges toward litigation. 
The result of this elaborate study of actual disputes, and ignoring of the settled 
doctrines that have grown out of past ones, is a class of graduates admirably 
calculated to argue any side of any controversy . . . but quite unable to advise a 
client when he is safe from litigation . . . . The student should not be so trained 
as to think he is to be a mere hired gladiator. 
Report of Committee on Legal Education, 15 A.BA PROC. 317, 340-41 (1892), quoted in 
R. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 59. 
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many statutory subjects. Yet, whatever the method of teaching 
doctrine, much of this learning will become substantially out-
dated by legislative changes or will never be used by law gradu-
ates in practice. Most doctrine used by lawyers is learned or 
relearned after graduation. Law schools should focus on teaching 
how to learn and use the law competently and efficiently and not 
on how much law can be taught in three years.8 
Bar review courses, commercial treatises, specialized reporter 
services, and continuing legal education programs demonstrate 
how well doctrine can be taught after graduation. Many of the 
legal subjects law schools will insist on retaining could be taught 
in less expensive ways. Law schools could use modern electronic 
methods to cut costs and bring the best law professors into every 
law school to teach doctrine. Programmed learning and com-
puter networking offer opportunities for greater learner partici-
pation in coursework addressed to doctrine than do most law 
classes. The resulting savings could be invested in small group, 
in-depth teaching in selected areas of law and in courses on ar-
eas of legal practice presently neglected by most law schools. 9 
4. Practical skills- The longstanding critique that the 
overly theoretical nature of legal education distorts a student's 
understanding of the law has had as its handmaiden for the last 
half century the critique that law schools fail to train students 
on the rudimentary skills necessary for minimal competence. 
For over a century the bar has played a dominant role in set-
ting the goals of legal education through bar admissions exami-
nations and law school accreditation. While instrumental in the 
formation of the Association of American Law Schools10 and 
generally supportive of law schools' efforts to raise admission 
standards, the ABA also struggled against what it viewed as the 
excessively academic hiring and education patterns of law 
schools.11 
8. Many law students take more and more doctrine courses because of insecurity 
when, in reality, doctrine can be learned more readily in practice than can a thorough 
understanding of many of the practice skills. 
9. Bar examiners may need to cooperate by allowing the bar examination to be 
phased over the first years of practice, like an actuary's examinations. Bar exams for 
certification in areas of specialty would allow the initial exam to cover fewer areas, al-
lowing for issuance of a limited license, the continuation of which would be contingent 
on passing additional examinations. 
10. The Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, at the urging of 
Henry Wade Rogers, dean of the Michigan and Yale law schools, provided the organiza-
tional initiative in 1899 that led to the formation of the Association of American Law 
Schools. R. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 96. It was not until 1914 that the AALS held meet-
ings separate from the ABA meetings. Id. at 114. 
11. In 1910 the ABA recommended a one-year clinical internship after law school 
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The goals of legal education have found various articulations. 
Early in the century, Dean Roscoe Pound noted that legal edu-
cation should (1) teach the basic mental skills of legal analysis 
and synthesis, (2) provide an understanding of the basic authori-
tative materials, (3) provide students a sense of the law as a so-
cial institution furthering social policies, and (4) lead students to 
internalize a sense of craft in their future accomplishments and 
undertakings in all these areas. 12 In his twenty years as 
Harvard's dean, this non-lawyer leader of the nation's most pow-
erful law school accepted the Langdellian premise that the study 
of cases was the study of legal practice. Yet Harvard students 
attacked the school for overreliance on the case method and a 
bland curriculum.18 Harvard's most recent curriculum study 
shows that law schools continue to struggle with the same dilem-
mas that existed in Pound's time.14 
Dean Terrance Sandalow expressed concern about the risks to 
legal education of aiming only at "fitting law students to the 
professional roles"111 they will play upon graduation. Such voca-
tionalism demeans the students and the opportunities for intel-
lectual and personal growth during law school. "The main object 
of legal education [should be] the enhancement of [students'] 
capacities to realize their human potential as it is understood in 
our culture. "18 Law school goals include the formation of those 
character traits and intellectual capacities that enhance clear 
thought, intelligent feeling, and knowing action. This entails 
more than the lawyering skills of analysis and advocacy. Legal 
education should assist students to "avoid common hazards to 
clear thought, such ... as self-interest, provincialism of time 
and place, overdependence on familiar categories of thought, the 
inability to tolerate uncertainty, and sentimentality."17 These 
temptations are hazards to clear thought precisely because they 
before admission to the bar. This is strikingly similar to Chief Justice Burger's recent 
suggestion. The ABA unsuccessfully asked for its acceptance by the AALS in 1913. Dean 
Rogers, who earlier had criticized the case method as not suitable for all students, led 
the academic attack on this clinical year by asserting that the case method provided 
practical training sufficient for admission to the bar. R STEVENS, supra note 3, at 120. 
See also Manning, Law Schools and Lawyer Schools-Two-Tier Legal Education, 26 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 379, 382 (1974). 
12. Prof. David F. Cavers, Seminar on Legal Education, Harvard University Law 
School (1973). 
13. R STEVENS, supra note 3, at 137 & n.53. 
14. See Michaelman, The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geome-
try, 32 J. LEGAL Eouc. 352, 353 (1982). 
15. Sandalow, supra note 6, at 167. 
16. Id. at 168. 
17. Id. at 171. 
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affect a lawyer's feelings, motives, and actions. Principles and 
feelings must be informed by a "knowledge of life" in guiding or 
judging conduct for the lawyer. Dean Sandalow notes that the 
skills of analysis and synthesis are broadened by contact with 
new subjects other than legal doctrine. 
Sandalow, however, seems to have confidence that such goals 
can be achieved without going beyond the walls of the legal 
academy. Frank Michaelman suggests that active or experimen-
tal learning about practice "is an inseparable aspect of proper 
cognitive learning. It is axiomatic in learning theory that when 
cognitive studies are accompanied by active engagement in their 
application to concrete problems, a likely result is fuller compre-
hension, better retention, and apter recall of the cognitive mate-
rial. "18 Law schools have an educational responsibility to offer 
some applied skills courses to give students confidence in their 
ability to perform effectively as lawyers. This criticism of the 
law school's failure to teach students the skills necessary to be 
competent trial lawyers has intensified since Chief Justice Bur-
ger's Sonnett Memorial Lecture in 1973. 19 
Many have criticized law schools for failure to teach human 
relations skills such as interviewing, counseling, decision making, 
fact investigation, and case planning. The counter argument 
notes that law schools provide a unique educational opportunity 
for students to immerse themselves in theoretical analysis. Prac-
tice skills can be acquired more efficiently after graduation. A 
university-based school of law should make those contributions 
to critical reflection and theory that are less available after 
graduation. 
This argument assumes that teaching students to think like 
lawyers requires most of the three years of law school and that 
added doctrinal courses are useful vehicles for the continuation 
of this thought development process. It could be, however, that 
refinement of legal thinking would better evolve in the more 
complex arena of actual cases, where it will need to be exercised 
in the future, rather than in additional courses on doctrine. The 
modeling and application of law school's high standards of 
thought and analysis to the multiple dimensions of an on-going 
legal problem would make law school learning more transferable 
and durable in practice. Lawyers are taught in law school how to 
learn doctrine. This equips graduates with a competence to ex-
18. Michaelman, supra note 14, at 353-54. 
19. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifica-
tion of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973). 
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pand their knowledge of the law. Law students are not equipped 
with similar competence in how to develop other legal skills. 20 
While books and Continuing Legal Education programs have 
refined the teaching of doctrine, thoughtful training in fact in-
vestigation, interviewing, counseling, advocacy, and negotiation 
are less well developed, less widely available, and demand blocks 
of time that are awkwardly large for most practitioners. 
Both law students and practitioners want more practical offer-
ings in law school. Zemans and Rosenblum21 found that practi-
tioners feel that law schools ignore many of the skills most im-
portant to their current practice-the communication skills of 
counseling and interviewing, negotiations, investigation, and ad-
vocacy. Their schools did not even apprise them of the impor-
tance of such skills to their future professional competence. 
These attorneys believe that many such skills areas can be effec-
tively taught in law schools. 22 
In the Zemans and Rosenblum study, lawyers ranked four 
skills as most important: (1) fact gathering; (2) capacity to mar-
shal facts and order them so that concepts can be applied; (3) 
instilling others' confidence in the attorney; and (4) effective 
oral expression. These practical skills are not peculiar to the 
practice of law. The three skills or areas of knowledge ranked 
next are more central to the law school mission: (5) ability to 
understand and interpret opinions, regulations, and statutes; (6) 
knowledge of substantive law; and (7) legal research. Then came: 
(8) negotiating; (9) drafting legal documents; and (10) under-
standing others' viewpoints to deal more effectively with them. 
Three of four lawyers responding ranked all of these as impor-
tant. Only about one in three lawyers ranked knowledge of polit-
ical science, psychology, economics, sociology, and accounting 
skills as important. 23 The attorneys attributed learning of the 
four most important skills to their own experience;24 the next 
three they credited to their legal education. The Chicago lawyers 
20. Most lawyers in the Zemans and Rosenblum study of the Chicago bar felt that 
the capacity to define a problem and to know where to seek the answer are vital skills 
Jaw schools provide. F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 
136-39 (1981). 
21. Zemans & Rosenblum, Preparation for the Practice of Law-The Views of the 
Practicing Bar, 1980 ABF RESEARCH J. 1, 5-6 (1980). 
22. The Stevens, Pipkin, and the Zemans and Rosenblum studies found that law stu-
dents wanted more practical courses. They wanted more emphasis on legal research and 
writing. See Pipkin, Legal Education: The Consumers' Perspective, 1976 ABF RESEARCH 
J. 1161, 1169-73; F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 20, at 135-44. 
23. See F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 20, 135-44. 
24. See id. at 135, Table 6.4. 
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thought that law school could appropriately contribute to acqui-
sition of certain skills-fact gathering, effective legal drafting 
and oral argument, interviewing, and understanding the view-
point of others. Law schools were not viewed as capable of devel-
oping the ability to inspire the confidence of others. 
Similarly, Baird studied the classes of 1955, 1965, and 1970 
from six schools (including Michigan) five years or more after 
their graduation. 211 With the exception of knowledge of statutory 
law, which was ranked second, the practitioners rated general 
practice competencies more highly than substantive knowledge 
as the elements essential to adequate legal performance. Baird, 
like Zemans and Rosenblum, found that the law school compe-
tencies were important to practice, particularly the ability to an-
alyze and synthesize law and facts. Yet, four out of ten lawyers 
considered the ability to write, communicate effectively, re-
search, draft legal documents, counsel clients, and negotiate es-
sential, while only one in four considered knowledge of common 
law essential. Baird found that overall, lawyers were not dissatis-
fied with their legal education for what it did, but felt it failed to 
attempt to do more. 
Most practitioners acquire practice skills by muddling 
through, commonly at the expense of their initial clients. They 
develop these skills by non-critically adopting behaviors of avail-
able role models, good or bad. New attorneys who enter more 
elite practice settings, with better role models and more atten-
tion focused on refinement of practice skills, may develop good 
skills with speed, efficiency, and reflective competency. Yet, 
many law firms do not provide the attention and supervision re-
quired for adequate skill development. The bulk of law gradu-
ates not entering elite law firms or governmental departments 
acquire a deficient post-graduate education where ineffective-
ness often masquerades as competence. 26 
B. Pedogogical Critiques 
1. Structural efficiencies- Commentators criticize legal 
training for its lack of clear structure. A smorgasbord of doctri-
nal offerings fails to recognize the basic premises of learning the-
25. Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to Law School Graduates, 29 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 264 (1978). 
26. Access to competent legal assistance at affordable costs for Americans other than 
the rich or the exceptionally injured constitutes one of the greatest challenges to our 
system of justice. 
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ory that learning be structured to challenge students continually 
and to build on past learning. The curriculum also contains con-
siderable overlap in coverage of doctrine. The course structure 
maintains student dependence and teacher control in the second 
and third years instead of greater student responsibility and au-
tonomy for their own learning as their competencies develop. 
2. Psychological deficiencies- Most law students approach 
graduate education with a predisposition to learn, based on their 
past successes. Law school confronts them with its Socratic puz-
zles that seem to have no closure, apparent structure, or rele-
vance. Students commonly receive negative classroom feedback. 
Evaluation occurs by exams scheduled after long periods of stu-
dents' uncertainty about their progress. Student evaluation gen-
erally consists of a grade with no explanation of what they did 
well and where they can improve. 
For many, this frustrating experience destroys the self-esteem 
and confidence necessary to take the risks required to learn. The 
experience and insecurities that result retard motivation, in-
quiry, and creativity for these students. Many law students learn 
to hate learning and the law school process; some become seri-
ously alienated.27 Others defend their sense of self by disengag-
ing from law school and taking comfort in the hope that "real 
lawyering" is not like law school. In the second and third years 
increased absence from and passing in class occur as students 
put more of their energy into job hunting or part time jobs. 28 
C. The Academic Critique 
While the law school holds itself out to the non-university 
world as providing service to society in both training profession-
als and providing analysis to guide appellate courts and law 
makers, it represents to the university world that law professors 
are serious academics. In what now seems a hoax, when law ini-
tially gained university admission, it held itself out as a science. 
27. Carrington & Conley, The Alienation of Law Students, 75 MICH. L. REv. 887 
(1977); Carrington & Conley, Negative Attitudes of Law Students: A Replication of the 
Alienation and Dissatisfaction Factors, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1036 (1978). Discussions with 
more recent students reveal continued frustration that limits motivation. The Car-
rington-Conley survey should be conducted again to compare current students' levels of 
dissatisfaction and alienation. 
28. Stevens found a sharp decline, after the first semester, in the time and energy 
students devoted to law school; by their senior year many students spend the equivalent 
of only two days a week studying for their courses. Stevens, Law Schools and Law Stu-
dents, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 652-53 (1973). 
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Even law's modified policy science aspirations after World War 
II did not command the respect of the university's true intelli-
gentsia. The addition, in recent years, of psychology, economics, 
history, philosophy, and jurisprudence to the law school curricu-
lum provides limited justification for the law school's claim to be 
an extension of liberal education in the university's humanist 
tradition. 
Law schools are powerful units of a university, not always be-
cause of the strength of their intellectual scholarship, but be-
cause of their connections to power in the broader society. An-
other source of strength is that legal education, with the Socratic 
method, is cheap-law schools provide the cheapest form of 
graduate education and make money for some universities. Al-
though many faculty members have made important and unique 
contributions to fields of study, most legal scholarship would not 
find acceptance in other academic units.29 Much of the best legal 
scholarship is not strictly academic, but rather focuses on practi-
cal application of legal theories to current political issues. These 
contributions are indeed important to society-though possibly 
not as important as law faculties might like to think. Law 
professors teach seminars on areas of research interest. Yet, stu-
dents commonly view seminars as intellectual hobby horses on 
which they must ride only because faculty have imposed a semi-
nar requirement. Many students do not get into the seminar of 
their choice; others have no desire for specialized research. 
Without students with a serious academic interest, even these 
focused seminars rarely provide occasion for law teachers to ad-
vance their research. 
Without some radical change in the generalist inclinations of 
most law students or the structure of legal education, academic 
policy analysis and empirical research are not likely to receive 
greater attention. If law schools created separate programs of 
professional and research degrees, at least one portion of the law 
school would attract a cluster of scholars and students commit-
ted to academic research. 30 
Thus, law schools face a dilemma. When they increase the so-
phistication and empirical basis of legal scholarship, they dis-
tance themselves from the interests of the majority of law stu-
29. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REv. 637, 
645-46 (1968). 
30. The Curriculum Study Project Committee of the American Association of Law 
Schools, in 1971, suggested a two year J.D. degree followed by either practical training or 
,more academic research for graduate students interested in teaching, not practice. P. 
CARRINGTON, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF LAW 2 (1971). 
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dents and the practicing bar.31 The purer the legal academy's 
thought, the greater its impotence. 
Many serious academics in the university are critical and re-
sentful of the higher pay, lighter work loads, and the lesser 
quantity and quality of intellectual production in the law 
school. 32 They also question whether law schools have a suffi-
ciently consistent theoretical or methodological framework with 
which to provide students with the skills and data needed to at-
tempt an analysis of society's fundamental problems or to ex-
amine society's fundamental premises. 
D. The Sociological-Political Critique 
The treatment of students in the classroom and throughout 
the law school experience inspires another critique of law 
schools. Although they cater to academically gifted students, law 
schools do not treat most students as adults. Faculty, with vary-
ing degrees of inte~sity, view many students as ignorant, unmo-
tivated, insincere, selfish, materialistic, and unwilling and unable 
to take greater responsibility for their professional growth and 
development. 
Commentators attack the classroom experience as demeaning, 
threatening, and damaging to students' egos.33 In the classroom, 
the intellectually more powerful demonstrate how to treat the 
less powerful. Students come to accept as inevitable, even legiti-
mate, the hierarchical ordering in class rankings, firm rankings, 
client rankings, substantive law rankings, and social rankings. 
31. For a concerned analysis of legal scholarship, see American Legal Scholarship: 
Directions and Dilemmas, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 403 (1983). 
32. For a criticism by a political scientist, see Hacker, The Sham of Professional 
Schools: How Not to Educate an Elite, HARPER'S, Oct. 1981, at 22. 
33. Nader has referred to the Socratic method as a game that only one can play: 
Harvard Law's most enduring contribution to legal education was the mixing of 
the case method of study with the Socratic method of teaching .... [T]hese 
techniques were tailor-made to transform intellectual arrogance into pedagogical 
systems that humble the student into accepting its premises, levels of abstrac-
tions and choice of subjects. Law professors take delight in crushing egos in or-
der to acculturate the students to what they called 'legal reasoning' or 'thinking 
like a lawyer.' The process is a highly sophisticated form of mind control that 
trades off breadth of vision and factual inquiry for freedom to roam in an intel-
lectual cage. 
Nader, Crumbling of the Old Order: Law Schools and Law Firms, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 
11, 1969, at 20. See also Kennedy, How Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & 
Soc. ACTION 71 (1970); Kennedy, Legal Education and Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 591 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy, Legal Education]; Savoy, To-
wards a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970). 
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They view realist, abstract, "hard" thought as supreme and 
emotive, value-laden, "soft" idealism as inappropriate in ad-
dressing the tough issues of the law.34 In law school competition, 
contentious individualism, aggressiveness, ruthlessness, pragma-
tism, instrumentalism, and the capitalistic ethic are stressed 
over cooperation, accommodation, compassion, community, ide-
alism, and a principled or professional ethic. 3 " The emotional 
rage that may be the motivating force necessary for serious law 
reform is not welcome in law school discussions. 
Critics charge that law schools, in addition to teaching stu-
dents to accept hierarchy, socialize students into accepting the 
legitimacy of the primary economic, social, and institutional or-
dering of society. A formalistic approach to morality limits nor-
mative thinking and proper behavior to rules and rule compli-
ance. Without the intellectual training to question the basic 
premises underlying the legal system and to construct alterna-
tive models that have greater claims on justice, law students ac-
quire an incremental, reformist attitude toward law and society. 
They are taught that things are basically okay, and the legal sys-
tem needs only some minor adjustments. 36 
Law schools also convey the message that lawyers deserve 
power, status, and material rewards because they safeguard the 
social order. The social order functions autonomously while the 
legal system provides a procedurally fair approach to resolving 
conflicts through the courts. The system of technical and proce-
dural law absolves "neutral, professional" lawyers of responsibil-
ity for their clients' ends and behaviors. With political activism 
and resistance seen as unlawyerlike and excessive reformism 
seen as unprofitable, students are presented with limited career 
images related largely to types of lawyering and of clients. 
Students are graduated from law school unprepared to prac-
tice law, and dependent on future learning opportunities to com-
plete their professional development. Large firms have greater 
resources for providing such clinical training than most other ca-
reer options except a limited number of government jobs. Train-
34. In comparing the specific legal skills of Chicago lawyers with the Heinz and 
Laumann prestige ranking of law areas, Zemans and Rosenblum found that the high 
prestige specialties were associated with the hard analytic skills and the less prestigious 
specialties were associated with the softer, interpersonal skills. See Zemans & Rosen-
blum, supra note 21, at 5-6; Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, 
Professional Roles and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111 (1978). 
35. See Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL 
Enuc. 247 (1978). 
36. Kennedy, Legal Education, supra note 33; see also Cramton, supra note 35; 
Cramton, Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL Eouc. 321 (1982). 
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ing opportunities, combined with the economic and status re-
wards of large firm practice, make the pref erred career choice all 
the clearer. 37 
Thus, law schools are criticized for channeling students to 
large firms that address only a limited number of society's most 
pressing problems. The best students, best firms, and best facul-
ties are happy with this arrangement. Students want access to 
the rewards offered by large law firms. Firms want students 
ranked by grades, dependent on the law firm's training, deferen-
tial to partners, and accepting of the existing legal order. 
Faculty members want students who show respect for their su-
perior intelligence, defer to their authority and status, and make 
limited demands on their time. They may also want a wealthy, 
prestigious, and powerful alumni-more readily assured by di-
recting students to large law firms. 
Law schools have a responsibility to present students with al-
ternative views of practice and legal careers as possible and wor-
thy goals. Law students begin their studies with great idealism. 
Many wish to serve disadvantaged persons or causes. Yet, they 
do not find in the law school a professional role model that will 
allow them to fulfill the social responsibility of the profession to 
seek greater justice. The present isolated, esoteric, and largely 
non-critical curriculum constitutes inadequate preparation for 
this undertaking. As Derek Bok has argued, if law schools were 
"not training lawyers but preparing 'leaders of the bar' . . . one 
would suppose that students . . . would be studying ways of cre-
ating simpler rules, less costly legal proceedings, and greater le-
gal protection for the poor and middle class. "38 
If law reform were the goal of legal education, law schools 
would need to be radically changed. Lawyers make and enforce 
the law, and they assist clients in their struggles for power 
through the law. Yet, entrenched injustices cannot be countered 
without lawyers. Law schools could do more in devising theories 
and models for reforms in the legal and social systems. These 
efforts would encompass new career options as well as enhanced 
opportunities within traditional career choices for professional 
service to society. 
The multiple criticisms of law school have been summarized 
in the shrillest terms by one of the primary exponents of clinical 
37. Large firms also have a generous government subsidy for their on-the-job clinical 
training because the client fees that support the training are tax deductible to corporate 
clients. 
38. Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAc., May-June 1983, at 38, 45. 
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legal education, Gary Bellow:39 
Most law is taught as if marshalling arguments on both 
sides of an issue were its end all and be all. There is very 
little closure around the question of right and wrong as 
the class moves from one case to the next. Indeed, justice 
as a criteria for decision is often dismissed in the first 
three days of classes as soft-headed and unrealistic. . . . 
[L]aw school is empirically irrelevant, theoretically 
flawed, pedagogically dysfunctional and expensive. 
III. GOALS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
Clinicians have variously identified the educational goals of 
clinical legal education over the last decade of experimentation. 
There has been some debate about whether clinical legal educa-
tion is a methodology for teaching about practice or a series of 
separate substantive subjects. As a colleague stated, clinical law 
"puts color in the empty outlines of the legal comic book.""0 
While clinical teaching methods can present substantive law 
with greater depth and comprehension than a more traditional 
course, it is an expensive means to teach substantive doctrine. 
Traditional law school methods are more efficient, even though 
they may engage the students less intensely than a clinical 
course. If second and third year law students become bored 
studying more areas of substantive law, the solution does not lie 
in teaching all of these subjects clinically, but in cutting down 
on doctrine and focusing on other aspects of learning essential to 
effective and reflective practice. 
In clinical legal education, substantive subjects should be ve-
hicles for learning about the difference between legal theory and 
the law as it operates in practice-the contextual, interpersonal, 
performance, and social elements of applying legal theory. Many 
substantive subjects can effectively carry these educational 
messages. The lessons learned in any appropriately selected area 
of doctrine can be transferred by the student to other legal ar-
eas, providing further insights, professional growth, and personal 
development in future practice. 
39. Bellow, On Talking Tough to Each Other: Comments on Condlin, 33 J. LEGAL 
Enuc. 619, 622 (1983). (The last sentence is Al Sacks's summary of Bellow's thesis.) 
40. Conard, Letter from the Law Clinic, U. Mien. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall 1973, 
at 16, 18. 
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An effective clinical teacher acts as a translator and inter-
preter for the students. The clinician introduces the students to 
the workings of the legal system. More important, the clinician 
helps the students become familiar with their new role and iden-
tity. Although people learn from unguided experience, analysis 
and interpretation quicken the pace of learning and foster the 
habit of reflection on experience. 
Building on the analytic skills learned in traditional classes, 
clinical teachers should encourage similar habits of inquiry, test-
ing, and critique about the skills of legal practice-interviewing, 
counseling, decision making, investigation, case preparation, ne-
gotiation, and advocacy. Clinics should continue students' devel-
opment of research and writing skills. Students will confront 
their ignorance in addressing real problems. Lessons in develop-
ing and maintaining a high level of competence in a real world 
context with its time and resource constraints will prove more 
durable than the lessons learned in the more artificial and pro-
tected classroom setting. 
Clinics should focus student attention on the interpersonal 
and institutional dimensions of the world of law practice. 
Clinical instructors help students analyze their experience by 
questioning how decisions are made in client interviews, stu-
dent-supervisor interchanges, and the institutions in which the 
students are practicing. Students should be encouraged to artic-
ulate the power and authority relations, emotive inputs, hidden 
agendas, institutional access and leverage points, as well as the 
effect of personality, bias, emotion, and status on outcome. Stu-
dents must struggle with their own decision making and actions 
under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty. 
Clinical education permits students to integrate into a single 
case the multiple subjects that they learn separately in their 
other course work-civil procedure, contracts, commercial trans-
actions, creditor's rights, evidence. In supervised fieldwork; stu-
dents will also integrate their knowledge of legal theory, of legal 
context, and of psychology with their own personal abilities, in-
securities, efforts, values, and judgments. 
Clinical teachers find students motivated to learn in clinical 
courses. In such courses students gain confidence and a sense of 
accomplishment that adds to their self-esteem. 
Students should also experience the meaning of the special 
role limitations and obligations that constitute professional re-
sponsibility. Clinical teachers should aid students in "issue spot-
ting" the pervasive ethical problems of legal practice. Yet, eff ec-
tive clinical training must go beyond this to provide an open 
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environment for discussion and debate about what behaviors are 
appropriate for a lawyer and how appropriate behavior is com-
monly sabotaged by psychological blind spots. Student attorneys 
will be involved in the fact development process in which law-
yers affect what facts get disclosed and how they are developed. 
They can see how confidentiality affects communication and 
trust. Students will experience the constant choices about decep-
tion and manipulation that lawyers and clients fac~ in their in-
teractions with each other, opponents, and legal institutions. 
Throughout the clinical work, the supervisor should assist 
each student to gain self-knowledge. Students can be encouraged 
to discuss how their emotions, personality, and behaviors may 
limit their effectiveness with clients, opponents, or the institu-
tions in which they operate. Supervisor feedback and use of 
videotape can help students develop a better understanding of 
how they present themselves-what verbal cues and self-effacing 
or self-aggrandizing characteristics they manifest, how well they 
listen and empathize, and how appropriately they respond. Stu-
dents can become more aware of the effects of their insecurity, 
anger, and confusion. Their interactions with clients, opponents, 
judges, supervisors, and other students provide opportunities to 
analyze how they use and respond to authority and the degree 
that they act on untested assumptions, struggle to control situa-
tions, and attribute their own meanings to relations with others, 
thereby failing to achieve real understanding. Clinic students ex-
perience feeling responsible for a client who is dependent on 
their competence, effort, and support. Student self-awareness 
can more easily be encouraged if the seminar includes some indi-
vidual case review with a person well trained in psychology. 
Such a person can help students perceive external demands and 
internal impulses that sabotage professional behavior.41 
In fieldwork, the temptations to turn a principled ethic into 
an instrumental morality to achieve a client's end become visi-
ble. Unlike courses on professional responsibility, clinical exper-
iences demonstrate the important difference between the intel-
lectual task of defining the right action and the psychological 
and motivational states necessary to take the appropriate action. 
The rewards from minor rule breaking are high and risks of de-
tection and sanction are low in legal practice. Desires to help 
41. See Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsibil-
ity, 16 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1, 20-23 (1963); Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: 
Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. C1N. L. REV. 91, 153-57 (1968); Watson, 
Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 248, 265-78 (1975). 
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clients and to succeed in a task enhance the temptations to 
amoral instrumentalism. Clinical supervisors should use the eth-
ical dilemmas and temptations of clinical fieldwork to assist stu-
dents to develop an awareness that professionalism entails not 
only knowing rules, but also a sense of obligation, a disposition 
to act appropriately, and an inner discipline for clear thinking 
and right action in the face of temptations to blindness, ration-
alization, or intentional deviance from rules.42 
Students in fieldwork can often observe in other attorneys the 
end product of patterns of professional corner-cutting. Such be-
haviors have consequences for the lawyer that are cumulative, 
corrosive of capacities to recognize and select appropriate behav-
ior, and hard to contain or reverse. In clinics, students should 
look beyond fixed ethical rules and begin to derive from their 
experience their own generalizable principles for professional be-
havior. A clinic experience cannot complete this process, but it 
can help students begin to develop habits of more careful 
thought and considered action about ethical problems that law-
yers encounter. 
While a clinical course cannot comprehensively cover all inter-
personal, professional, and psychological skills, it can demon-
strate to students their importance in the practice of law and 
initiate the habits of asking questions and seeking answers about 
such subjects. The clinic experience makes such topics a proper 
subject for public articulation and questioning with other law-
yers. Students should be urged to find colleagues in practice who 
will continue the enterprise of dialogue and analysis. 
If clinical education can help broaden the agenda of analysis 
beyond the legal doctrine and the immediate skill involved to 
the broader questions about the contextual, the personal and 
psychological, and the ethical and social elements of legal prac-
tice, then the experience will enrich the students' future practice 
and enhance their chances for personal and professional growth. 
Clinical education seeks to teach students to become self-learn-
ers in their practice of law. Unlike the doctrine courses that may 
never be used or may become obsolete, an appropriate clinical 
42. 
If we lived in a State where virtue was profitable, common sense would make us 
good, and greed would make us saintly . . . . But since in fact we see that ava-
rice, anger, envy, pride, sloth, lust and stupidity commonly profit far beyond 
humility, chastity, fortitude, justice and thought, [we] have to choose, to be 
human at all . . . why then perhaps we must stand fast a little .... 
Thomas More to his daughter, Margaret, in Act 2, R. BoLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 140-
41 (1962). 
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agenda for learning will stay relevant throughout the student's 
legal career. If students get some direction in law school and 
build confidence in developing their lawyering skills, they may 
feel le_ss constrained in their initial job choices. 
The above agenda for clinical courses make the learning from 
experience in the inhibiting and distracting world of practice the 
prime subject. Such learning complements traditional learning 
from law school authorities. Learning to learn from experience 
does not entail abandoning theory and ignoring the ideas of 
others. If undertaken properly, clinical teaching should en-
courage such pursuits.43 Autonomy, however, requires learning 
from experience as well as from authorities and their theories. 
Autonomy requires freedom from dependence on received wis-
dom alone. It entails testing the theories of others and generat-
ing your own theories. Because all theory is rooted in experience, 
students cannot effectively learn how to test and generate the 
theories of practice without some exposure to the actual world of 
·1aw. 
For most law students, clinic provides a demythologizing ex-
perience as they test the theories of law in practice. In clinics 
that represent the accused, the mentally ill, or the poor, the the-
ory testing and theory building is even more dramatic as stu-
dents examine the market system of delivering legal services and 
the workings of "law" and "justice" at the bottom of the legal 
system. Experience representing the least advantag~d in society 
provides unique opportunities to critique the legal system and 
the adversary model. Learning to cope in cases representing the 
least powerful eases the transition to representing more powerful 
clients. If law schools would focus more attention on these 
broader subjects and modes of thinking that arise in practice 
and lessen slightly the number of courses on doctrine and legal 
analysis, law graduates would be better prepared to serve them-
selves, their clients, and society. 
Such a clinical agenda, if done thoughtfully, is neither anti-
intellectual, unbecoming of a university, nor mere vocationalism. 
It is in full accord with the goals of legal and humanistic educa-
tion. Supervised instruction in the world of practice-to which 
law students are soon to be abandoned-offers the best potential 
"to enhance the capacity of students to think clearly, to feel in-
43. "An interest in the practical should not preclude, on the contrary it should invite, 
a lively interest in theory." Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1321 
(1947). 
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telligently, and to act knowingly.""" 
IV. STUDENT AND ALUMNI RESPONSE TO CLINICAL COURSES 
Clinical legal education has been labeled the most significant 
innovation in legal education in recent decades.n Arguments 
over its pedagogic utility have been fought and won at most law 
schools. Evaluations by Michigan students from 1973 to present 
show that 99 % of clinic students would recommend it to others. 
The overwhelming number of students who have completed the 
clinic felt that they learned a great deal. For those skeptical of 
student evaluations as a measure of the worth of a course, the 
Student Senate in 1981 polled a random sample of nearly 200 
Michigan graduates who had taken the clinic from 1970 to 1980 
to determine if practitioners were less enthusiastic than stu-
dents. Ninety-five percent of the respondents stated that they 
would take the clinic again instead of a comparable number of 
credit hours in traditional classes, if they were in law school to-
day. A similar percentage disagreed with the statement that 
clinic experience was unnecessary because it provided what they 
would have learned anyway in their first year of practice. When 
asked to compare the applicability of their clinical experience 
with their other law courses, 94 % found it at least as useful, and 
69 % found it more useful. 
General Michigan Alumni Surveys of the classes of 1966, 1967, 
1976, and 1977 show 28 % of the respondents suggested clinical 
courses be increased in the law school. 46 Of all the doctrine and 
skills courses listed, clinical law received the second highest re-
sponse for increases, following only suggestions for more courses 
on negotiation. 
A research effort by Educational Testing Service to measure 
clinical skills demonstrated that law students with clinical expe-
rience were more effective in interviewing exercises than non-
clinical students. 47 
Clinical legal education joined the law school club when stu-
dents and the bar were criticizing the overly theoretical curricu-
44. Sandalow, supra note 6, at 173 (1984). 
45. Gee & Jackson, supra note 4, at 881 (footnote omitted). 
46. See Adams & Chambers, supra note 2, at 18. 
47. The author and several other clinicians developed several simulation interview 
exercises, which ETS field tested for reliability before assessing law students. D. ALDER-
MAN, F. EVANS & G. WILDER, ASSESSING CLINICAL SKILLS IN LEGAL EDUCATION: SIMULATION 
EXERCISES IN CLIENT INTERVIEWING (1980). 
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lar offerings of law school. It was a period of optimism about the 
law's ability to effect reform if the disadvantaged obtained rep-
resentation as competent as the representation available to the 
privileged. The Ford Foundation's seed money provided the fi-
nal important ingredient. 
Today, students are less interested in law reform. Many of the 
easy victories in civil rights, welfare law, and housing procedures 
· have been won, only to be undercut by other social forces. Ad-
vances in criminal procedure have limited the worst abuses but 
hopes for comprehensive reforms in criminal justice are dimin-
ished; few lawyers believe that they can affect the causes of 
crime or the chances for rehabilitation of the convicted. Reform-
ist notions, while not less needed, have encountered resistance in 
society. With lessened opportunities for students to act on their 
idealism through reformist activities, law students in greater 
numbers have turned to concerns about careers in a tightening 
job market. Thus, the early reformist forces of clinical programs 
have faded. 
With declining law school enrollments and limited external 
funding for clinical courses, economic pressures encourage law 
schools to reduce clinical fieldwork courses and substitute simu-
lation courses that focus primarily on lawyer's skills. Although 
clinical teachers have refined and widely adopted simulation ex-
ercises for skills training, students have consistently given them 
lower evaluations than actual fieldwork experiences. Simulations 
are effective for certain learning but they are always artificial; 
students are less motivated to participate than they are in a few, 
carefully selected, real cases. 
Given the changes of attitude and economics, clinics must 
prove their worth in their capacity to train law students in the 
skills and professional dimensions of their work that traditional 
law school courses neglect. 
V. THE LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF CLINICAL LEGAL 
EDUCATION 
In the years that clinical programs were struggling to gain a 
foothold in law schools, they were overzealous in their claims. 
The most thoughtful criticism of clinical programs has come 
from within its ranks, through the writings of Robert Condlin. 
He criticizes clinics for not having a sophisticated understanding 
of lawyering or of domination and manipulation in the world of 
practice. Clinicians fail to demonstrate the critical self-reflection 
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that they purport an ability to teach. They focus almost exclu-
sively on adversary skills to the exclusion of developing more 
collaborative modes of lawyering better equipped to serve the 
needs of society. While purporting to have a reformist agenda 
pointing toward a fairer legal system with a greater claim to jus-
tice, clinicians have no coherent theory from which to criticize 
the present system. Absent a consistent theory of law, practice, 
or society, clinical programs cannot offer viable hopes for a bet-
ter system that will redress the issues of racial and sexual dis-
crimination, the maldistribution of resources and opportunities, 
or the unequal access to affect and use the law in our society. 
Finally, Condlin asserts that clinicians have no research method-
ologies from which they could generate sophisticated knowledge 
of the operation of the legal system in society. Having little of 
intellectual interest to share with their non-clinical colleagues, 
they distance themselves from the remainder of the faculty and 
defensively immunize themselves from criticism. 48 
All of these criticisms are legitimate. The fact that many of 
them could be addressed to most traditional law faculty does not 
remove their sting. To these failings, others could be added. 
Clinics' desire to find threshold cases appropriate for student 
trial experience conflicts with the possible social good of simpli-
fying the law and delawyering many areas where access to a fair 
and legally correct outcome depends on access to a lawyer.49 
Being victims of their own legal education and practice experi-
ence, clinical teachers are generally unversed in those theories 
from neighboring fields that are relevant to their teaching. Most 
clinicians are not well read in psychology, economics, history, 
and philosophy, nor do they affiliate with others who have ade-
quate training and experience in these fields. As a result, clinical 
educators, failing to generate new theories about the law in oper-
ation, are also ineffective in applying such learning that exists in 
related areas of study. 
48. Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade, 33 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 604, 607, 610 (1983). See also, Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substitut-
ing Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223, 278-81 
(1981). 
49. For example, a dose of the adversarial system has been prescribed for juvenile, 
mental health, and child abuse and neglect proceedings. Because threshold practice op-
portunities and funding opportunities exist in these fields, some of which may still get 
goverment funding, many clinics seize the chance for courtroom exposure. In doing so, 
the clinics continue to professionalize the field and increase individuals' dependence on 
lawyers. Some clinicians legitimize extension of the adversary model to every case. To 
assure a continued flow of cases for students to test their adversary skills, clinicians may 
blind themselves to both the need and the potential for reform and delawyerizing many 
tasks. 
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A final criticism attacks the overall legal and academic quality 
of most clinical teachers. Many are undistinguished in either 
their academic or practice backgrounds and are considered of 
lesser intellectual merit than the average traditional law teacher. 
Notwithstanding these legitimate criticisms, the clinical move-
ment in its first decade has had some success. For example, a 
number of educational materials on interviewing, counseling, 
case planning, trial advocacy, and negotiations have been devel-
oped. Although these materials vary in scope and degree of so-
phistication, they are far more structured and thoughtful than 
anything that law students were exposed to in the past.Go 
Various videotape materials have also been developed, as have 
innovative teaching methods to enhance the clinical experience. 
Law school programs using clinical methods and materials can 
provide far more organized and less pressured learning of law-
yering skills than is generally available in the serendipitous ini-
tial years of legal practice. With better teaching materials, a 
more careful choice of cases to maximize learning instead of gen-
erating a fee, and clinical teachers whose primary goal is educa-
tional, a good clinical course provides superior professional 
training than is available in even the best law firm 
environments. 
If one focuses on the more modest claim of clinical educa-
tion-that it can contribute to professional development by in-
troducing students to the rules, role demands, rites, and rituals 
of legal practice-it has not been a failure. Clinical programs are 
providing students with a more thoughtful, structured, and use-
ful skills training than heretofore offered in law schools or in the 
initial years of practice. In addition, many dedicated clinical 
teachers provide greater insights into the ethics of lawyering and 
the problems of manipulation through domination and decep-
tion than students will receive elsewhere. Many clinical pro-
50. Some examples of the clinical materials available to teach lawyering skills are: G. 
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION 
IN ADVOCACY (1978); P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL (1979); D. BINDER & S. 
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); L. 
BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PRO-
CESS (1978); K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL (1978); J. JEANS, 
TRIAL ADVOCACY (1975); MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES (1980); M. MELT-
SNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCA-
TION (1974); T. SCHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1976); A. WATSON, THE 
LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976). 
Negotiation training materials include R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1983); 
Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and Behavior, 31 KAN. L. 
REV. 69 (1982); S. Pepe, Introduction to Legal Negotiation (1980) (copy on file with U. 
MICH. J.L. REF.). 
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grams expose their students to a demythologizing and critical 
experience about how the legal system works for the people most 
in need of society's protection. Students who take clinics find 
the learning complementary to their other courses. 
While customer satisfaction may warrant a future for clinical 
programs, the growing constraints on law schools will likely re-
quire multiple justifications for relatively costly clinic programs. 
Because curricular changes commonly serve faculty needs more 
than student needs, Gee and Jackson found that, to survive, a 
legal curricular change need only be minimally successful in 
conveying ideas and skills to students. Other factors are equally 
or more important. Educational innovations that survive in law 
schools must be (1) less costly than alternatives, (2) easy to ad-
minister, (3) congruent with the overall structure of the institu-
tions, ( 4) easily integrated into legal tradition and habits, and 
(5) positively reinforcing for administrators, teachers, and "to 
some extent, students who are involved in the program or 
practice. "111 
Law school innovations that are costly, involve high levels of 
time and energy to sustain, require substantial institutional ad-
aptation, and are inconsistent with the current incentive system 
of the law school will probably fail. Indeed, Gee and Jackson 
used clinical legal education as their hypothetical case for likely 
demise. They found costs of clinics high. Clinical teaching was 
"exceptionally hard work." Absent full-time clinical semesters, 
like medical schools, clinical courses did not integrate easily with 
the rest of the curriculum. Clinical faculty recruitment, promo-
tion, and tenure criteria did not easily fit the traditional in~titu-
tional model. Clinicians "burned out" from their low status, "ex-
hausted with their workload, with the absence of positive 
reinforcements, and with their battles against deans and 
faculty."112 
If clinics are to continue they must not only prove their worth 
to law schools by making greater contributions in the training of 
law students; they must also solve some of the structural 
problems that isolate and remove clinical programs from the 
mainstream of legal education. 
Given the salary levels, status limitations, and working condi-
tions of clinical fieldwork teachers, it is no surprise that the 
brightest law graduates and lawyers have not been queuing up 
for these positions. When these factors are added to the admin-
51. Gee & Jackson, supra note 4, at 969 (emphasis omitted). 
52. Gee & Jackson, supra note 4, at 973. 
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istrative and practical frustrations that come with the supervi-
sion of students in an active case load, fieldwork instruction is 
difficult to sustain. This is particularly true if the clinic is oper-
ating under conditions of scarcity of staffing and resources. A 
traditional classroom with its twenty hour teaching week is far 
easier than a forty to fifty hour clinical teaching week. Clinical 
fieldwork, even at a manageable student-supervisor ratio of ten-
to-one, precludes the time for academic reading that is essential 
to meet traditional university role expectations. Summers pro-
vide limited time for recovery, catch-up reading, and some re-
search. If fund raising, proselytizing, and apologetics are also 
necessary to defend and maintain an educational program hav-
ing an uncertain institutional status, the reasons why clinical le-
gal educators have not been able to live up to their rhetoric be-
comes clear. 
Many of the problems of workload, incentives, status, and se-
curity can be solved by law schools. Law faculties, on present 
funding, could maintain a limited clinical program for a limited 
number of students. Such an effort would probably require more 
than the three to five percent of their budgets that some law 
schools currently devote to clinical programs. Faculties con-
cerned about lower academic standards applied in hiring clinical 
teachers could attract "more qualified" candidates by increasing 
the priority given such appointments as well as the incentive 
packages offered to the clinicians. If the clinical program struc-
tures required no more than one semester per year of fieldwork, 
clinical teachers could teach traditional courses in alternate 
semesters and receive traditional pay for a nine month academic 
year. This would necessitate at least two permanent clinicians 
for each sustained clinical course, but might attract more quali-
fied lawyers. Additional supervisors would still need to be re-
cruited on fixed period contracts. 
Clinical programs cannot thrive on law school budgets and 
limited grants. If they are to grow, the problem of funding must 
be solved. The solution requires the help of the private bar. The 
bar complains about the overly-theoretical nature of law schools. 
They have supported the clinical movement, but solutions to the 
funding problem require greater help. It is unrealistic to expect 
law school funds to support legal services distributed without 
charge through clinic programs. No medical school could main-
tain their clinical programs on such a premise. 
The organized bar should support public funding for services 
provided by law schools to the indigent. It should permit stu-
dent practice in fee-producing cases or should collectively pro-
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vide some alternate funding source for clinical programs. The 
American legal profession, one of the wealthiest occupational 
classes in the world, 53 should assume some responsibility for 
funding this aspect of the education and quality standards of its 
ranks. The bar could also urge that those using the courts pay 
for training of its future officers by a slight increase in filing or 
motion fees. 
Such funding for law school clinical and other professional de-
velopment programs would provide the economic base for 
schools to obtain qualified clinicians. More and more secure 
funding would permit clinical faculty to make the teaching and 
research contributions necessary for clinical studies to fulfill its 
potential and justify a permanent place in the university law 
school. 
The organized bar could also relieve the substantive law de-
mands on students and schools by limiting the number of sub-
jects on the initial bar exam and providing follow-up examina-
tions for practice in areas of specialization. Continuing legal 
education programs could teach much of the substance that law 
schools are attempting to cover. For many practitioners, learning 
such subjects after graduation might upgrade the quality of the 
teaching through recorded lectures by preeminent authorities. 
Substantial changes in law school curricula occur slowly. 
Clinical programs are likely to instigate only modest modifica-
tions. They have moved, in models and materials, beyond anec-
dotal ad hominems to the beginnings of a thoughtful and struc-
tured approach to professional training. While it might be 
regretted that the Council on Legal Education for Professional 
Responsibility did not provide more funding directed to devel-
opment of materials and models rather than mere expansion of 
numbers of programs, such mistakes cannot be undone. Al-
though clinical courses have made advances in methods, materi-
als, and messages, clinical studies must continue to grow in the-
ory and structure to establish permanent roots in the academy. 
Clinical programs need to develop more insightful explanations 
about lawyering and legal institutions that can be generalized 
and transferred to other settings to fulfill their promise. Devel-
oping theories, research models, and teaching methods in these 
fields will be sufficient to warrant a legitimate place for clini-
53. Its fees each year have been estimated to be about $30 billion. Cutler, Conflicts of 
Interest, 30 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1016 (1981). One tenth of one percent of this would be $30 
million. If each of the nation's 500,000 lawyers were assessed an added $50 bar dues each 
year, $25 million could be provided to law schools for clinical programs and public legal 
service. 
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cians in law schools. 
It would be interesting to compare the progress made in the 
fifteen years of clinical legal education with the progress of the 
legal educational innovation begun 100 ·years earlier. If the 
Langdellian case method were evaluated in 1885, it may not yet 
have fulfilled its potential. It had its detractors among legal aca-
demics; it may have had a less welcome reception among the bar 
and law students than has clinical legal education. The case 
method fulfilled a law school need; it flourished and has today 
generated hundreds of casebooks of substantial intellectual so-
phistication. If law schools provide a similar welcome to clinical 
legal studies, I feel confident that the textbooks for clinics in 
2085 will be respected by all fair-minded academics.64 
Although clinics have not fulfilled their potential nor lived up 
to their aspirations, this failing is not unique to clinical educa-
tion. Throughout their history, law schools have aspired to 
achievements beyond their immediate reach. Even the most gen-
erous reading of alumni surveys shows that the goals of legal ed-
ucation outdistance its accomplishments. The criticism leveled 
at clinical programs, that they have not developed a coherent 
and critical theory for our legal system, and have not developed 
adequate alternatives to the system of law and delivery of legal 
services that have a better claim to distributive and procedural 
justice, are criticisms that can be shared with law faculties 
generally. 
Given the recruiting patterns, the time demands, and the pro-
fessional inclinations of most clinical teachers, even under the 
better funded scenario, it is unrealistic to expect that clinical 
teachers will generate the critical body of theoretical knowledge 
needed to reform the legal and social order. Such knowledge is 
more likely to come from a limited number of the traditional 
academic faculty who can devote the time needed for such an 
undertaking. Clinicians can play a supportive role. They can de-
velop examples and counterexamples for critical theory. They 
can provide useful contributions to joint empirical research ac-
tivities. From their unique involvement with lawyers' behavior, 
clinicians can add insights and normative suggestions on how 
lawyers can and should act in various contexts. Clinicians can 
interpret critical theory, giving it meaning in specific contexts, 
and reinforcing its importance to students in fieldwork and case 
seminars. Students will credit the utility of such theory if they 
54. For an imaginative view into the future, see Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Educa-
tion-A Twenty-First-Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL Enuc. 612 (1984). 
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find it discussed in and connected to the world of practice they 
are entering. 
Demands for greater practical and clinical involvement in law 
schools surfaced in the days of Pound and Reed, they resurfaced 
with Frank and Llewellyn,611 and have now reappeared. Today, 
law schools have responded more fully than ever before. While 
some legal academics would like to end this "trendish fad" and 
return to "purer forms" of legal education, such regression 
would be a mistake. It might satisfy faculty needs, but not the 
needs of students, the bar, or society. It would not end the com-
plaints about the fundamental flaws of legal education. 
Law schools should not use growing student careerism and di-
minishing law school resources as the occasion for ending clinical 
legal education or reducing it to simulations that introduce more 
artificiality to law school. Faculties deceive themselves if they 
think that students weaned from clinics will return with re-
newed devotion to law school classes and seek added offerings in 
psychology, history, philosophy, and economics. Many law stu-
- dents want to learn how to be lawyers. Instead of delaying and 
frustrating this desire, law schools should utilize the student mo-
tivation attached to it. If done carefully, clinical work can pro-
vide the educational vehicle to teach a broader and more hu-
manistic view of legal practice and professionalism. Leaders in 
legal education need to work with leaders in the bar to capture 
the learning and successes of the last fifteen years of clinical le-
gal education and build on its future potential to address and 
resolve a problem of mutual interest. 
55. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL Eouc. 211 (1948). 

